SUMMARY Throughout this century, as in many other countries, the proportion of the British population in the older age groups has increased. The effect this has on the economy is discussed. Topics covered include the determinants of the economic status of old people; the reasons for the choice of retirement ages; the burden of the aged on younger generations; the costs of pension schemes; the disincentive effects of pensions on savings; and poverty in old age.
The changing composition of the population with an increase in the relative and absolute number of old people has been reflected in economists' growing attention to the economics of an aging population and issues related to old age. Among these are the problems of age related pension design and the impact on the rest of the system of financing these pensions; poverty among the aged and their relationship to younger generations; the costs of providing public services for the aged and the tax burden associated with this; and the economic dimensions of the retirement decision itself. Just like the poor, the old are always with us. Some of the issues raised by an aging population which have interested economists are reviewed. The review is by no means complete, and much of the analysis remains in a preliminary stage, but the references will direct the attention of those readers who. wish to pursue some of the themes in greater depth.
The picture
In 1900 there were 1*8 million people in the United Kingdom who were classified as "old", that is, over the age of 65 years. By 1984 this number had grown to 8-4 million. Of all households in 1979, 23u/, consisted of either one retired adult or two retired adults. Between mid 1980 and mid 1996 the number of people over pensionable age (65 for men, 60 for women) will rise from 9-7 million to 9-8 million. This is just a 1%Y rise. As a proportion of the population those of pensionable age will fall from 17-304 to 16 9'%, between 1980 and 1996. The composition of the retired population will, however, change over the period, and this is important for discussions of social policy. Between 1980 and 1996 those aged below 75 years but over 65 will fall from 6*6 million to 6-2 million, while those over 75 years will rise from 3 1 million to 3-6 million (+ 160/,). Since the costs to society, through pensions and various public services, of someone over the age of 75 are greater than of those aged between 65 and 75 then this change in the composition of the older population has significance for discussions of future trends in public/social service provisions and public spending.
This picture of a relatively aged population is not confined to the UK, it is common throughout Europe (table 1) .
The issues
There are basically two extreme views that are held about the economic status of the aged in modern societies such as those of the UK and the United States of America. First, the elderly are seen as destitute, enfeebled, neglected, and hungry. Against this is the stereotype of the "wellderly" which stresses that most older citizens live in houses that This is an over simplified account of how the calculation is actually made. The sophistication of the calculation does not, however, detract from the essence of making the decision. Leaving aside all of the ethical questions-which are of obvious importance-decision making based on this kind of logic has important implications for the allocation of resources between age groups in society. If it is always shown on cost benefit terms that the benefits greatly exceed the costs on projects for the young but that there is a deficit of costs over benefits on projects for the old, then the old will always be disadvantaged.
Perhaps this is the implicit calculation that many make when deciding whether some scarce medical treatment (eg, renal dialysis) should be allocated to a young or an old person.
Finally, are the old a "burden" on younger generations? In the climate of the current debate it is frequently argued that maintenance of the aged will place a heavy economic burden on the resources of younger generations today and in the foreseeable future. This burden is the basis of the forthcoming "crisis" in the welfare state in the early part of the 21st century. The resources will not be available to finance pensions and old age related social services. It is appropriate to ask if this is a reasonable view of things to come, especially since it is not a particularly new debate but old wine placed in new bottles.
The costs of providing services to those over the age of 75 years are proportionally greater than to those who are younger. In 1979 the Public Expenditure White Paper showed that spending per head on health and social security services for those over the age of 15 was £339 per annum whereas for those who were 75 years plus it was £555 per annum. The number aged 75 and above is expected to rise by 16%. between 1983 and 1996, from 3-1 million to 3-6 million. On the basis of these figures it is felt that the aged will become an increasing burden.
It should, however, be realised that this increase in social spending on the aged would require only a 10%, per annum increase in productivity (on average) for the whole economy. There is every reason on past performance to suppose that this is realisable, especially given that the number of individuals who will be joining the labour force will be increasing up to the end of the century, without taking technological change into account.
In table 2 the support ratios (ie, the estimated number of working people needed to support each retired person) are shown. As can be seen, this "burden of the aged" thesis is not supported.
The burden placed on the welfare state comes not only from the number of aged consuming public 99 Table 2 Support ratios 1979-2029   1979  1989  1999  2009  2019  2029   3-34  3-44  359  3-62  3-35  2-94 Source: Government Actuary Quinquential Review 1982 services. In recent years stresses have come from the number of registered unemployed who have more than doubled over the past 10 years. A 50% reduction in the number unemployed would be enough to finance any increases in welfare spending arising from the aged. While this will not be easy to achieve there is every prospect that by the end of the century unemployment will have reduced and the burdens that are currently being debated will be seen in a new light. Moreover, the child dependency ratio should fall, given recent demographic trends. In total then there is little evidence to substantiate the notion that intolerable economic burdens will be placed on future generations due to current demographic changes.
The costs of pension schemes While demographic changes might not, in themselves, give rise to financial burdens, the way in which pension schemes have been formulated might. This seems to be the generally held opinion regarding the State Earnings Related Pension Scheme. It is clear that the expectations of this scheme are that our children will treat us more generously through income transfers than we treat our own parents. The writing of implicit social contracts of this kind is a fascinating topic since it involves massive intergenerational transfers of income without future generations having been consulted when the contract was written. What happens if they decide that they will not or cannot honour them?
The costs of the various pensions, SERPS, and the Basic State Retirement Pension (BSRP) are shown in table 3.
Clearly, from these statistics it is the build up in the cost of SERPS that is giving the greatest concern.
There is, however, another set of costs of interest to the economist and seldom thought about by others. These are the costs of the impact of pension 
